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WHAT A (VERY) SMART TRIAL JUDGE
KNOWS ABOUT JURIES
Shari Seidman Diamond*
Francis Doorley**
In courtrooms across the country, trial judges meet the citizens who
are called for jury duty and have an opportunity to watch as those
citizens serve as jurors.  Judge Weinstein has used his vantage point in
the courtroom to good effect.  His response to the jury reflects the
deep and nuanced understanding of an attentive and very smart trial
judge—an understanding reflected in his scholarly commentary about
the jury, his decisions, and the procedures he uses with juries in his
courtroom.
It is no coincidence that the wise Judge Weinstein is a trial court
judge: the vantage point of a trial judge for analyzing the jury is dis-
tinctive.  In the course of presiding over jury trials, trial court judges
see juries face-to-face.  In contrast, appellate court judges review jury
decisions from a distance and only when one of the parties has ap-
pealed.  These two different opportunities to view the jury have im-
portant consequences for what judges can learn about juries.  The trial
court judge sees not merely the jury firsthand, but also the live trial,
which includes the witnesses and parties who the jury evaluates in
reaching its verdict.  In contrast, the appellate court judge has only the
words of the trial record.  This more limited resource explains why,
with good reason, appellate courts are expected to defer to trial courts
in reviewing issues that touch on witness and juror demeanor.1
* Howard J. Trienens Professor of Law and Psychology, Northwestern University School of
Law; Research Professor, American Bar Foundation.  Our thanks to Bob Burns for his thought-
ful feedback.
** J.D., Northwestern University School of Law.
1. “[Appellate judges] should take into account the fact that the trial judge is likely much
more familiar with the case than they are . . . .  [As an appellate judge,] you defer to the lower
court because you think they know more about what’s going on, which is true.” A Conversation
with Associate Justice Stephen Breyer and Professor Stephan Landsman, YOUTUBE (Apr. 28,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yBMD7hN9wRc; see also State v. Johnson, 199 A.2d
809, 817 (N.J. 1964) (stating that an appellate court “should give deference to those findings of
the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses
and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy”).  Authority for this
deference is also reflected in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the
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A second and less appreciated difference between trial and appel-
late judges also puts appellate courts at a disadvantage in understand-
ing and evaluating juries.  Although all verdicts disappoint one of the
parties, jury verdicts lead to appeals only when one of the parties is
unwilling to accept the verdict.  Thus, appellate cases constitute only a
small and biased sample of jury cases, those in which one party be-
lieves it has an argument worth pursuing that the jury got it wrong.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that prominent Second Cir-
cuit Judge Jerome Frank was one of the most aggressive critics of the
jury (although he was also critical of judges).2  Judge Frank handled
corporate reorganizations when he was in practice, and was appointed
to the Second Circuit from his position as the head of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.  He never served as a trial court judge,
and it is unclear whether he ever saw a jury trial firsthand.  Of course,
we cannot know whether such experience would have altered his view,
but his perspective on the jury and its role as a decision maker con-
trasts sharply with the perspective of federal district court judge Jack
Weinstein.  Judge Weinstein’s writings on the jury reflect his rich rep-
ertoire of jury trial experience, and express his deep appreciation for
the jury’s abilities and performance.
Judge Weinstein is a prolific and distinctively scholarly judge.  In
preparing this Article, we reviewed cases in which he referred to the
jury, as well as published articles in which he discussed the jury and its
role in the legal system.  His analyses almost always match the find-
ings of empirical scholarship on the jury, and his opinions often refer
to those findings.  But Judge Weinstein also describes innovative uses
of juries and jury decisions, and offers hypotheses about juries that
scholars have not yet tested.  He not only reflects current knowledge
about the jury, but also offers proposals and a research agenda for the
future.  In a few instances, we disagree with Judge Weinstein’s views
on the jury, but our disagreements are only at the edges.
Part I begins with an overview of Judge Weinstein’s perspective on
the appropriate behavior of jurors and his evaluation of what juries
actually do.  Part II discusses Judge Weinstein’s views on the way to
conduct an optimal jury trial that flow from his perspective on the
jury.  In Part III, we evaluate three innovative, albeit controversial,
approaches that Judge Weinstein has championed to take advantage
of unique strengths the jury can offer: the advisory jury, the nullifying
reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’
credibility.”).
2. JEROME FRANK, Defenses of the Jury System—Proposed Reforms, in COURTS ON TRIAL:
MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 126 (1949).
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jury, and the use of jury verdicts in other cases as a reference point for
reviewing appropriate damages.  Part IV compares Judge Weinstein’s
views of the jury with those of other trial court judges, highlighting his
leadership role among trial judges.
I. IDEAL AND REAL JURIES
One view of the jury sees the ideal juror as a blank slate.  According
to an early image of the jury, jurors “should be as white paper.”3  This
picture of an empty page has some appeal: the hypothetical juror who
has no prior expectations or beliefs about the world, let alone the par-
ticular facts of the case, should have no predisposition to favor one
side or another.  As Judge Weinstein has concluded, however, this hy-
pothetical “blank slate” juror is a fanciful image. “Every juror brings
values and information into a courtroom,” and “that shapes how the
evidence will be interpreted.”4  Empirical research provides ample
corroboration for this view,5 and in his typical scholarly fashion, Judge
Weinstein draws on both social psychology and philosophical writings
for support.6
Judge Weinstein not only rejects this empty vessel image of the jury
as a descriptive matter; he also sees the prior experiences and beliefs
that jurors bring to the courtroom as a necessary feature of the jury.
As Judge Weinstein has observed: “[J]urors must come into the court-
room with enough experience to provide the hypotheses from real life
necessary to decide issues of fact.”7
But Judge Weinstein goes further: he views the input that jurors
provide based on their backgrounds and experiences as a key strength
of the jury.  Many courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
praise the jury for its common sense;8 instructions often tell jurors to
3. Mylock v. Saladine, (1781) 96 Eng. Rep. 278 (K.B.) 278; 1 Black. W. 480, 481.
4. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 2d 357, 369
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
5. See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981); Shari Seidman Diamond
& Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the
Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 557 (1992); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive
Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 519 (1991);
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror
Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 189 (1992); Vicki L. Smith &
Christina A. Studebaker, What Do You Expect?: The Influence of People’s Prior Knowledge of
Crime Categories on Fact-Finding, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 517, 528–29 (1996).
6. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
7. Id. at 369.
8. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (“[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies
in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a
group of laymen . . . .”).
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use their common sense,9 and attorneys often echo that message.10  It
is less clear what “common sense” actually means.11  Judge Weinstein
provides examples that reflect an expansive understanding of the con-
tours of common sense, although he may go further than many of his
colleagues on the bench would feel comfortable doing.  In United
States v. Chong,12 for example, he concluded “the jury can be ex-
pected to have general knowledge of mislabeling of some Chinese
products,” noting that “[jurors] help bring knowledge of real world
commerce into the courtroom.”13  In Braune v. Abbott Laboratories,14
he rejected the defendant’s claim that the statute of limitations enti-
tled the defendant to summary judgment, concluding that a jury
should determine when the plaintiffs discovered that their reproduc-
tive abnormalities were a result of their in utero exposure to diethyl-
stilbestrol (DES) rather than to natural causes.15  Judge Weinstein
found that a jury might reasonably decide that a woman would ini-
tially suspect that her medical problem stemmed “from genetic or
other non-fault based difficulties, rather than from human interven-
tion.”16  He concluded: “These are considerations particularly under-
stood by our representative jurors whose practical common sense
reflect the wisdom of a consensus of the community’s cross section.”17
More fundamentally, Judge Weinstein identifies the jury’s mixture
of backgrounds and experiences as a prominent source of what the
jury can offer that a judge cannot.  Acknowledging as few judges do,
at least publicly, the “rather sheltered background” of the typical
judge, Judge Weinstein salutes the jury as the source “for knowledge
of how life operates outside our courthouses and our social circle.”18
He singles out, in particular, the advantages of the jury in employment
9. See, e.g., CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(CIVIL) 6 (3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (“Consider all of the evi-
dence in the light of reason, common sense, and experience.”); PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
FOR CIVIL PRACTICE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE § 3.2 (rev. ed. 2006)
(“[U]se your common sense to reach conclusions based on the evidence.”).
10. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: Suc-
cesses, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1555 n.63 (2012).
11. See generally Marilyn MacCrimmon, What Is “Common” About Common Sense?: Cau-
tionary Tales for Travelers Crossing Disciplinary Boundaries, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1433 (2001).
12. 990 F. Supp. 2d 320 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
13. Id. at 322.
14. 895 F. Supp. 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
15. Id. at 537 (“[T]he statute of limitations is triggered when a plaintiff either discovered or
reasonably should have discovered her ‘injury’ from DES.”).
16. Id. at 552.
17. Id.
18. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes
for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 118 (2008).
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discrimination cases.  In one discrimination case, he denied summary
judgment for the defendant, observing that “the inquiry into whether
the plaintiff’s age, sex, national origin, or race caused the conduct at
issue often requires an assessment of individuals’ motivations and
state of mind,” and that “juries possess special advantages over judges
in making this sort of assessment.”19  Similarly, he denied summary
judgment in another discrimination case in which an unmarried preg-
nant teacher was fired by a church-affiliated school and sued for gen-
der discrimination under Title VII.20  Acknowledging that differences
in experience and outlook might well make a difference in how differ-
ent jurors would evaluate the veracity of the witnesses and the hon-
esty of the defendant’s proffered reason for dismissal, Judge
Weinstein found that “a decision by a cross-section of the community
in a jury trial” would be the appropriate way to resolve the matter.21
Judge Weinstein has expressed the same appreciation for the jury’s
added perspective in other opinions.22  It is no wonder that in such
cases, Judge Weinstein has called for a “sparing” use of summary
judgment.23
We note that the benefit of the jury’s community perspective has a
broader application.  Many cases explicitly require an assessment of
community standards. We would add those cases to Judge Weinstein’s
examples of situations in which jurors, by pooling their experiences,
can construct a better evaluation than the judge is likely to produce.
Thus, when the plaintiff claims that the defendant intentionally or
recklessly caused emotional distress to the plaintiff, the jury may be
asked to determine whether the defendant’s behavior was “outra-
geous”24 or “extreme and outrageous.”25  If the definition of extreme
and outrageous conduct is “conduct that an average member of the
community would regard as atrocious and beyond all possible bounds
of decency,”26 how should the judge or jury determine whether the
19. Chapala v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., No. 04 CV 3458(JBW), 2006 WL 2882567, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 6, 2006).
20. Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
21. Id. at 361.
22. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein, J., sitting by
designation) (“A federal judge is not in the best position to define the current sexual tenor of
American cultures in their many manifestations.”).
23. Chapala, 2006 WL 2882567, at *4.
24. “‘Outrageous conduct’ is conduct so extreme that it goes beyond all possible bounds of
decency.  Conduct is outrageous if a reasonable person would regard the conduct as intolerable
in a civilized community.” JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CAL. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CACI)
§ 1602 (2013).
25. ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 212.
26. Id.
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standard has been met?  In the Arizona Jury Project, in which we
were permitted to videotape a set of real jury deliberations,27 we
watched one of the juries approaching this task by attempting to con-
vince one member of the jury that, although the defendant’s behavior
had been reprehensible, it was not “beyond all possible bounds of de-
cency.”28  The jurors recounted their work experiences in a variety of
settings: an office, a construction site, a school, a home where one of
the jurors worked as a housekeeper.  Each of the jurors reported neg-
ative experiences they had seen or personally experienced in their job
setting, some of them involving shouting and insulting behavior simi-
lar to that allegedly experienced by the plaintiff.  The comparisons
convinced the jurors that the plaintiff’s treatment could not be charac-
terized as extreme and outrageous.  Thus, the jurors pooled their di-
verse experiences just as Judge Weinstein would have predicted.
Judge Weinstein has recognized that local knowledge can also ap-
propriately inform the decision making of juries.  In Chance v. Du-
Pont,29 a suit was brought on behalf of children injured by blasting
caps against manufacturers of the caps for failure to place any warning
on the individual caps.30  Judge Weinstein, who would later pioneer
large-scale uses of case consolidation,31 ordered severance, transfer-
ring cases to the federal district courts where each of the injuries oc-
curred.  He gave an example of the likely advantage of subjecting the
claims to “the critical scrutiny of local jurors with knowledge of local
practice.”32  In West Virginia, a newspaper article reported that two of
the plaintiffs were injured while playing with a blasting cap brought
out of the mines by a worker.  Deciding that the federal court sitting
in West Virginia with a West Virginia jury would be best equipped to
decide whether blasting caps are familiar articles around coal mines,
he concluded, “Community standards are a vital element in assessing
the actions of the parties in this suit.”33
Do these examples indicate that the jury is the optimal decision
maker for all disputes and offenses?  Possibly, but we need not go that
far to make the case for its general value, and for its unique advan-
tages in many instances.  As Judge Weinstein has said, the jury ensures
27. See generally Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Study-
ing an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2003).
28. ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 212.
29. Chance v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
30. Id. at 449.
31. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d,
818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
32. Chance, 371 F. Supp. at 449.
33. Id.
2015] WHAT A TRIAL JUDGE KNOWS ABOUT JURIES 379
that “the legal system is grounded in reality.”34  Judge Weinstein is not
alone in his appreciation of the jury.   Surveys of U.S. citizens consist-
ently show they prefer juries over judges.35  Thus, as Judge Weinstein
has suggested, a jury can enhance the sense of both the parties and the
public that justice has been served.36
Yet in some academic and judicial circles, the advantage of a
judge—an educated and expert decision maker—over a jury of
laypersons seems self-evident.  Particularly in complicated civil cases,
some commentators have questioned the ability of laypersons to reach
justifiable conclusions.37  Judge Weinstein, informed by his years of
attentively watching the juries in his courtroom, could not disagree
more.  He warns, expressing a view that is consistent with the empiri-
cal evidence, that “[t]he jury’s power and capacity to deal with com-
plex facts and come to a reasonable resolution of a dispute should not
be underestimated.”38  Not surprisingly, given his assessment of the
ability of juries and his appreciation of the advantages the jury has
over the judge, he opposes the expansive use of summary judgment to
take cases away from juries.39
This positive assessment of the jury should not be confused with
naı¨ve trust.  Judge Weinstein appreciates that jurors have human frail-
ties.  Thus, he has recognized that jurors may use evidence of a crimi-
nal record to draw conclusions about the defendant’s probable guilt,
despite an instruction not to do so.40  Extensive empirical research
supports this view.41  He has expressed concern about the potential
prejudice that may arise when an indictment includes a multiplicity of
counts that may exaggerate the jury’s impression of the nature and
34. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 116.
35. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the
Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333
(1988); Harris Poll #9: Just Under Three in Five Americans Believe Juries Can Be Fair and Impar-
tial All or Most of the Time, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Jan. 21, 2008), http://www.harrisinteractive
.com/harrispoll/index.asp?PID=861.
36. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 2d 193, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
37. For a review of this commentary, see, for example, Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehen-
sion of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 733–36 (1991).
38. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 117 & n.557 (quoting Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449
F. Supp. 2d 992, 1020 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)).
39. For agreement from others, see, for example, Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein,
Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990); Suja A. Thomas, Essay,
Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007).
40. United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 945–46 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
41. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); Theodore
Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal
Record on the Decision To Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353 (2009);
Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors
Use Prior Conviction Evidence To Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985).
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scope of the defendant’s criminal activity.42  Empirical research on the
related topic of joinder supports that concern.43  And he has recog-
nized that media exposure to prejudicial information cannot necessa-
rily be cured through voir dire,44 again a position with ample empirical
support.45  In general, however, his trust in the jury’s good sense is
warranted.  One result of this trust is that Judge Weinstein has advo-
cated loosening some of the strictures imposed by a narrow reading of
relevance.46  In doing so, he recognizes that there are dangers in this
more relaxed view,47 but he concludes that “it is best to err on the side
of openness.”48  This approach would also comport with the way juries
attempt to reach verdicts that are consistent with the evidence.  When
jurors are not provided with what they think they need to reach a
defensible verdict, they may fill in the gaps with unreliable
information.
Judge Weinstein’s positive perspective on jury performance may in-
fluence and be strengthened by the way he conducts jury trials in his
courtroom and the way he thinks jury trials should be conducted.  We
turn next to those features of a Weinstein-run jury trial.
II. JUDGE WEINSTEIN’S VIEWS ON OPTIMIZING JURY TRIALS
In acknowledging that jurors are active, rather than passive, deci-
sion makers, Judge Weinstein sees the implementation of some trial
procedures as simple common sense:
Jurors must be treated with great respect and common sense by
being supplied with the following: pen and paper to take notes in
the courtroom; the right (seldom utilized) to question witnesses
through a writing presented to the judge; explanations of courtroom
proceedings; clearly written instructions on the law; precisely and
simply phrased verdict sheets; lists of witnesses and exhibits; and,
when called for during deliberations, the evidence and such aids as
calculators.  Testimony requested by a deliberating jury can be read
in court or sent into the jury room in redacted form (now available
42. United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133, 160–61 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
43. See Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Joinder of Criminal Offenses: A Review of
the Legal and Psychological Literature, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339 (1985).
44. In re NBC Universal, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 49, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Jurors’ assurances
that they have not been influenced by media reports are not necessarily dispositive.”).
45. See Nancy Mehrkens Steblay et al., The Effect of Pretrial Publicity on Jury Verdicts: A
Meta-Analytic Review, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219 (1999).
46. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 2d 357, 367
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 371.  For empirical support on the costs of jury blindfolding, see Diamond & Casper,
supra note 5, at 513; Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Blindfolding the Jury, 52 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 247 (1989); Diamond et al., supra note 27, at 1.
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almost instantaneously from the court reporter).  In the future,
video recordings should be available in some cases.49
It turns out that this judicial common sense is far from universally
shared among the judiciary.  Although more than two-thirds of mod-
ern courts permit juror note-taking50 and provide a copy of the written
jury instructions,51 the jury instructions themselves, including verdict
forms, are far from models of clarity.  Jury instructions frequently in-
clude unnecessarily opaque language, but they also present structural
challenges: the piecemeal construction of jury instructions may leave
jurors confused about how the pieces fit together, that is, how to inter-
pret one instruction in light of others.52  Instructions also avoid men-
tioning subjects like insurance that may naturally arise in jury
deliberations, on the unrealistic assumption that silence in the instruc-
tions means that the jurors will not spontaneously introduce those
topics.53  Analysis of the Arizona Jury Project deliberations shows
that jurors spend considerable effort in parsing jury instructions, that a
majority of the comments about legal issues (approximately 79%) are
consistent with the law, but that inaccurate statements occur.54  Al-
though nearly half (approximately 47%) of these legal errors were ex-
plicitly corrected during deliberations,55 Judge Weinstein’s call for
clearer instructions remains a goal that courts still need to pursue.
Judge Weinstein also calls for permitting jurors to submit questions
for witnesses.  Here he is a leader, but although the trend is in his
direction, the 2006 National Center for State Courts State-of-the-
States survey found that jurors were permitted to ask questions in
only one out of ten federal trials.56  Similarly, few judges followed
Judge Weinstein’s practice of providing jurors with a list of witnesses
and exhibits.57  Finally, Judge Weinstein, appreciating that jurors may
find it useful to review testimony during deliberations, calls for mak-
49. Jack B. Weinstein, The Roles of a Federal District Court Judge, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 439,
445 (2011).
50. GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT
EFFORTS:  A COMPENDIUM REPORT 32 tbl.24 (2007) (reporting that in 71.2% of federal trials
and 69.0% of state trials, the jurors were permitted to take notes).
51. Id. (reporting that a copy of the written instructions was provided in 79.4% of federal
trials, although in only 68.5% of state trials).
52. Diamond et al., supra note 10, at 1564–75.
53. Id. at 1575–86.
54. Id. at 1555–56.
55. Id. at 1558.
56. MIZE ET AL., supra note 50, at 32 tbl.24 (reporting that written juror questions for wit-
nesses were permitted in 11.4% of federal criminal trials and 10.9% of federal civil trials, and in
15.1% of state criminal trials and 16.1% of state civil trials).
57. Id. at 32 tbl.24, 34 n.61 (reporting that jurors were given a notebook, which often contains
lists of exhibits and expert witnesses, in 11.2% of federal trials and 5.8% of state trials).
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ing that evidence available to jurors when they request it.58  And why
not?  Such requests are typically denied by other courts, but Judge
Weinstein, recognizing that the technology needed to comply with
these requests exists, is prepared to update courtroom procedures
with approaches that can assist the jurors.59
Respect for the jury underlies most of the approaches Judge Wein-
stein takes in his courtroom.  It also shows up in his review of trial
court procedures used by other courts. Monroe v. Kuhlman60 in-
volved a habeas petition in which the defendant claimed that the court
had violated his right to judicial supervision of his trial by permitting
the jurors to examine evidence during breaks in the trial, instructing
them not to discuss it.61  Judge Weinstein found no violation and, in
fact, found the trial court’s approach in this case “a commendable ex-
ample of new procedures that are increasing the effectiveness of the
modern jury.”62  Contrasting the literacy and education levels of to-
day’s jurors with those of the past, Judge Weinstein observed: “To-
day’s jurors are not the largely illiterate plebians of the old English
system . . . .”63  Noting the practice of permitting civil juries to take
home documents and examine them over the weekend or during court
recesses, he concluded, “Jurors must not be insulted by having their
time wasted with inefficient and unnecessary procedural formali-
ties.”64  The scholarly Judge Weinstein is also a practical man.
III. THREE CONTROVERSIAL APPROACHES THAT JUDGE
WEINSTEIN ADVOCATES
Most of the procedures that Judge Weinstein uses in his jury trials
discussed in Part II have received a favorable response from a growing
number of other trial courts, both state and federal.  The approaches
discussed here are more controversial.
A. The Advisory Jury
As jury skeptics seek ways to cabin jury influence by, for example,
curtailing the nature of the cases that juries decide,65 and as trials have
58. See Weinstein, supra note 49, at 445.
59. Id.; see also Verizon Directories v. Yellow Book U.S.A. Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 136, 142–43
(E.D.N.Y. 2004).
60. 436 F. Supp. 2d 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
61. Id. at 475.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 481.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV.
1673 (2013) (arguing that the Constitution does not require that juries decide patent validity).
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become increasingly rare occurrences in federal court,66 Judge Wein-
stein, in his typical independent fashion, has been swimming against
the tide.  Drawing on his admiration for the unique perspective a jury
of laypersons can offer, he has advocated the use of advisory juries.  A
federal judge can impanel an advisory jury “to enlighten the con-
science of the court” even when the parties have no right to trial by
jury under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.67  As in a bench trial, the judge must enter findings of fact and
law, and the judge retains full responsibility for the verdict in the
trial,68 but, as Judge Weinstein suggests, the reactions of the advisory
jury can provide a perspective that reaches beyond that of a judge.
In NAACP v. Acusport Corp.,69 Judge Weinstein impaneled an ad-
visory jury to advise the court on whether defendant gun manufactur-
ers and distributors had created a public nuisance and, if so, to
provide guidance on the nature of appropriate injunctive relief.70
Judge Weinstein might have simply cited Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 39(c), which authorizes the court to try any issue with an advi-
sory jury in any case in which there is no right to trial by jury.  He did,
of course, cite to the rule.71  But the scholarly Judge Weinstein did not
stop there.  Reviewing the early history of the advisory jury in the
English Chancery Court, he traced the roots of Rule 39(c) to the right
of the chancellor in equity to “have its ‘conscience enlightened.’”72
Judge Weinstein then showed that nearly every state, as well as the
federal courts, authorizes use of an advisory jury.73
This was not the first time Judge Weinstein employed an advisory
jury.  He used one twenty-five years earlier in a case with an eerily
modern resonance.  In Birnbaum v. United States,74 several American
66. Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1257 fig.2 (2005).
67. JENNER & BLOCK LLP, MOORE’S ANSWER GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL MOTION PRACTICE
§ 11.25 (2014).
68. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) states: “In an action tried on the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusion of law
separately.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
69. 226 F. Supp. 2d 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
70. Id. at 396–97.
71. Id. at 397.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c) provides: In all actions not triable of
right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory
jury, or, except in actions against the United States when a statute of the United States provides
for trial without a jury, the court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury
whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right. FED. R. CIV. P.
39(c).
72. Acusport, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
73. Id. at 398.
74. 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), remedy modified, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
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professors alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had in-
tercepted their mail, and they brought a claim for damages caused by
the CIA’s unlawful surveillance activities within the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).75  Trial by jury is specifi-
cally prohibited in FTCA cases, but use of an advisory jury is permit-
ted,76 and the court impaneled an advisory jury.  As required, Judge
Weinstein reported that he arrived at an independent decision in find-
ing for the plaintiffs,77 but acknowledged that the reaction of the ju-
rors “served to affirm the opinion of the court that the emotional
distress these plaintiffs suffered was the sort that would be exper-
ienced by reasonable people under the almost unprecedented circum-
stances of these cases.”78  The opinion recounts different damages
awards apparently suggested by different jurors, so it is unclear how
the advisory jury was instructed or whether it was asked to reach a
group verdict.79
Critics of the advisory jury have raised the concern that the very
broad discretion courts have when they choose to impanel an advisory
jury is not without its dangers.  Because the judge’s own findings en-
tirely displace any advice from the advisory jury, the advisory jury is
invisible on appeal.  This invisibility, some have argued, “allows the
trial judge to be informal, experimental, or even sloppy with the advi-
sory jury without risk of reversible error.”80
By the time Judge Weinstein impaneled an advisory jury in NAACP
v. Acusport, Inc. in 2003, he had developed procedures for handling a
trial with an advisory jury.  In his opinion in the case, he described in
detail the procedures he used, which closely resembled those he uses
in trials involving a constitutional jury.81  This case involved a six-
week trial of sixty-eight defendants; the evidence included complex
statistical evidence and expert testimony.82  Following Judge Wein-
stein’s standard practice, he provided each juror with a notebook that
contained selected exhibits.83  At the end of the trial, following sum-
mations, he instructed the jury on the law.84  The jury verdict form
asked the jury to decide whether each defendant was liable or not
75. Id. at 970–71.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (2012).
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
78. Birnbaum, 436 F. Supp. at 988.
79. Id.
80. Note, Practice and Potential of the Advisory Jury, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1365 (1987).
81. NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 464–76 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
82. Id. at 465.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 465–66.
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liable.85  Testimony and other evidence were made available to the
jury during its deliberations on its request.86
Procedures for the advisory jury were distinctive in only two ways.
First, the advisory jurors were not told they were sitting in an advisory
capacity.87  This omission gave the advisory jurors no reason to view
their decision as any less important than their decision would have
been had it been issued by a constitutional jury.  Second, although
unanimity is required of federal constitutional juries in both civil and
criminal cases, Judge Weinstein instructed the advisory jury merely
that “[u]nanimity is desirable.”88  When the jurors reported on their
third day of deliberations that they were unable to reach a unanimous
verdict, the judge told them that a verdict agreed to by at least ten
jurors would be accepted.89  Following that instruction, the jury found
forty-five of the defendants not liable, but remained in disagreement
on the other twenty-three.90  Although Judge Weinstein did not ex-
plore what happened during jury deliberations,91 he concluded that a
10–2 requirement “should leave the court with a comfortable feeling
of consensus.”92  In this perspective, he is aligned with the United
States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Louisiana,93 approving
nonunanimous decision rules in state criminal trials based in part on
the assumption that allowing less than unanimous verdicts will not af-
fect the quality of the deliberations.94  Here, based on empirical evi-
dence—some of which Judge Weinstein cites—we would disagree.95
If maximally robust deliberations are as important for an advisory jury
as for a constitutional one, why should unanimity not be required?
On the other hand, if an advisory jury is simply a group of court advi-
sors, why not follow deliberations with a discussion between the judge
and jurors in order to provide the court with a fuller understanding of
the nature of that advice?  If such an advisory jury were treated like a
technical court advisor on community reaction, such discussion would
85. Id. at 466.
86. Id.
87. Acusport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
88. Id. at 466.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 477.
92. Id. at 475.
93. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
94. Id. at 361–62.
95. See, e.g., JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 83 (1988); REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE
THE JURY (1983); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The
Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2006); Valerie P. Hans, The
Power of Twelve: The Impact of Jury Size and Unanimity on Civil Jury Decision Making, 4 DEL.
L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2001).
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presumably have to be on the record to enable the parties to learn
what the jurors had to say and to facilitate appellate review of the trial
court’s decision.96  If jurors would have to be told in advance to expect
that post-deliberation discussion, would that notice affect the jury’s
deliberation?  The advisory jury and its potential expansion invite
study, and Judge Weinstein has opened the door.
The advisory jury in any form is a rarely used, but potentially attrac-
tive, institution with a long history and a statutory pedigree.  Its po-
tential value in bringing jury sensibilities into the courtroom was
palpably demonstrated in a recent case in which no jury, either consti-
tutionally mandated or in an advisory form, was impaneled.  The
plaintiffs in Floyd v. City of New York97 claimed that the stop-and-
frisk policy of the New York City Police Department violated the
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause’s guarantee against discrimination.98  The plaintiffs had origi-
nally demanded a jury trial, and sought damages and remedial ac-
tion.99  In late 2012, the plaintiffs dropped their demand for monetary
damages, which entitled them to have Judge Shira Scheindlin, who
had been handling the case, conduct the trial and decide the case with-
out a jury.100  Over the course of two pretrial hearings, Judge
Scheindlin questioned the wisdom of not having a jury because it was
“important to hear from the community, so to speak.”101  “That’s what
jurors are,” she said.102  “I obviously will do my best at the trial to be
fair and impartial to both sides. . . .  But I’m only saying you’re not
getting many points of view.”103  In fact, Judge Scheindlin could have
addressed her expressed concern by impaneling an advisory jury.  For-
tuitously, Judge Scheindlin was a speaker at the Clifford Symposium
at DePaul University College of Law in honor of Judge Weinstein that
stimulated this Article.  When asked if she had considered impaneling
an advisory jury in the Floyd case, she said that she wished she had
thought of doing it.104  The availability of advisory juries to enhance
96. See, e.g., TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
97. 861 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
98. Id. at 278.
99. Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Without Jury, Judge Warned That Stop-and-Frisk
Ruling Would Be Disputed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2014, at A15.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Conversation with Judge Shira Scheindlin, S.D.N.Y., in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 25, 2014). After
the symposium, Judge Scheindlin says she gave further thought to the question of an advisory
jury. She doubts in retrospect, for several reasons, that an advisory jury would have been suita-
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the perspective (as well as the perceived legitimacy) of a judicial deci-
sion, advocated so eloquently by Judge Weinstein, is worthy of greater
attention from both the scholarly and judicial communities.
B. The Nullifying Jury
Judge Weinstein’s trust in the jury is most evident when he writes
about nullification.105  Although he would not instruct jurors on their
power to nullify, an approach that some favor,106 he urges judges to
“exercise their discretion to allow nullification by flexibly applying the
concepts of relevancy and prejudice and by admitting evidence bear-
ing on moral values,”107 applauding nullification as “one of the peace-
ful barricades of freedom.”108  His expressed attitude toward
nullification is diametrically opposed to that of most appellate courts.
For example, the Second Circuit, citing the Federal Judicial Center’s
Benchbook for United States District Court Judges, defined nullifica-
tion as a violation of a juror’s oath to “render a true verdict according
to the law and the evidence.”109  The court “categorically” rejected
the notion that jury nullification is desirable or that a court is permit-
ted to allow it to occur when the court can prevent it.110
Judge Weinstein’s focus on a particular form of nullification and his
sense of how often it occurs underlie his favorable attitude toward
nullification.  Although he acknowledges that an unacceptable form of
nullification occurs if a jury convicts when the law would have re-
quired acquittal, he sees that possibility as remote, despite some em-
pirical evidence that it can happen.111  But he also sees the kind of
nullification he favors—that is, the nullification that leads to an ac-
quittal of a legally guilty but morally sympathetic defendant—as an
uncommon occurrence.  Under his approach of allowing nullification
without fostering it by explicitly instructing jurors about their right to
ble in the Floyd case. Email from Judge Shira Scheindlin to Shari Diamond (Mar. 27, 2015) (on
file with author).
105. See Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury “Nullification”: When May and Should a Jury
Reject the Law To Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L.J. 239 (1993).
106. See, e.g., B. Michael Dann, “Must Find the Defendant Guilty” Jury Instructions Violate
the Sixth Amendment, 91 JUDICATURE 12 (2007).
107. Weinstein, supra note 105, at 241.
108. Id. at 254.
109. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 225 (4th ed. 2000)).
110. Id.
111. Weinstein, supra note 105, at 239 n.2 (acknowledging evidence that this form can occur,
but characterizing the possibility as remote in practice). But see Irwin A. Horowitz et al., Chaos
in the Courtroom Reconsidered: Emotional Bias and Juror Nullification, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
163 (2006).
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nullify, he expects nullification to be rare.  Judge Weinstein trusts the
jury to generally try to follow the law, tempering it only on occasion
with mercy.  The empirical record supports his view.112
C. Jury Verdicts as a Reference Point for Reviewing
Appropriate Damages
Juries are frequently criticized as unpredictable in their damage
awards.113  The evidence of unpredictability is ambiguous.  The impact
of relevant legal factors on the compensatory damages that juries
award is well documented, accounting for more than half of the large
variation in awards with a small number of predictor variables.114  The
strongest predictor of awards is typically the legally relevant severity
of injury, as measured somewhat crudely on an eight- or nine-point
scale.  Nonetheless, with substantial variation in damage awards unac-
counted for, some portion of it can no doubt be explained by the lack
of standards provided by the legal system on damages—particularly
general damages.  Jurors complain about the lack of guidance,115 and
mock jurors show substantial variation in the damages they award for
pain and suffering in response to identical case facts.116  The variabil-
ity of awards drops when the mock jurors deliberate, so that jury
awards show substantially less variation than individual mock juror
awards, but it remains higher for pain and suffering than for economic
damages, consistent with the greater difficulty of that decision.117
Against this backdrop, how should a judge determine, in reviewing
a jury verdict, whether a compensation award “deviates materially
from what would be reasonable compensation”?118  Judge Weinstein
was faced with this task in a diversity case involving repetitive stress
injuries, in which New York law called upon him to evaluate a jury
verdict by applying that standard.119  He responded by creatively ask-
ing the parties to have their experts identify sets of what they would
112. See, e.g., Diamond et al., supra note 10, at 1537.
113. See generally Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 375 (2011).
114. Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
243, 244–45 (1997); see also David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages
Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecu-
niary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109 (1995).
115. Nicole L. Mott et al., What’s Half a Lung Worth? Civil Jurors’ Accounts of Their Award
Decision Making, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 401, 408–09 (2000).
116. See generally Saks et al., supra note 114, at 243.
117. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of
Variability and Ways To Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 313–17 (1998).
118. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 2014).
119. Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640, 653 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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characterize as comparable cases for the judge to use as potential
benchmarks for the pain and suffering awards of the three plain-
tiffs.120  Judge Weinstein used these cases to inform his opinion,
describing in detail his method and the cases he used in the appendix
to the opinion.121  Scholars have suggested using similar approaches to
inform jury awards for pain and suffering,122 and attorneys turn to jury
verdict reporters to suggest “going rates” as they negotiate settle-
ments.  Although no consensus has developed about the optimum way
to identify relevant comparable cases, Judge Weinstein’s approach in
Geressy clearly invites consideration and evaluation of the general
strategy.
IV. HOW OTHER TRIAL JUDGES VIEW JURIES
As this brief overview of his rich record shows, Judge Weinstein has
a clear-eyed and nuanced appreciation of the jury.  And he recognizes
that his admiration is shared by most trial judges.123  Significant ma-
jorities of trial judges in numerous surveys report that the jury is capa-
ble of understanding complex legal issues in the cases they hear.124
They believe that neither bias nor miscomprehension is responsible
when their verdict would have been different than the one reached by
the jury.125  In addition, trial judges generally report that they usually
agree with the jury on the ultimate outcome of the trial.126
In a 2000 survey of Texas state and federal trial judges, the judges
were “very complimentary” of juries.127  Almost 1,000 judges re-
sponded to the survey,128 including 70% of all Texas state trial judges
and 65% of all federal trial judges.129  Those surveyed were nearly
unanimous in believing that jurors did at least “moderately well” in
reaching a “just and fair” verdict.130  The judges also had faith in the
jury to deliver a correct verdict; 77% of the judges surveyed re-
120. Id. at 657.
121. Id. at 660–66.
122. See Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the
Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 87 (2006); see
also Diamond et al., supra note 117.
123. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 105, at 241.
124. R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench, 26 GA.
L. REV. 85, 114 (1991); see also Allen Pusey, Judges Rule in Favor of Juries, DALL. MORNING
NEWS, May 7, 2000, at 1J.
125. Pusey, supra note 124, at 10J.
126. Id.
127. John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Juries Rule, 54 SMU L. REV. 1681, 1684 (2001).
128. Pusey, supra note 124, at 1J.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 10J (reporting that 98% of judges surveyed agreed with this sentiment).
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sponded that if they were personally a defendant in a criminal case,
they would prefer to have a jury decide their case, and a majority said
that in a civil case, they would also prefer a jury trial.131
A significant minority of the judges surveyed did not view the jury
in such a positive light, however.132  Among the Texas judges, 30.1%
of state trial judges and 27.4% of federal trial judges believed that
juries should decide fewer cases,133 and 19.7% of state trial judges
stated the right to a jury trial should be either reduced or eliminated
altogether.134  It is not clear whether this pattern would generalize be-
yond Texas, which uses juries in an unusually broad range of cases
(e.g., the right to a jury trial is provided for in divorces135 and juvenile
cases136).  Ultimately, however, only 1% of the judges gave the jury
system “low marks.”137
Further, most judges across various surveys report that they agree
with the jury’s verdict in most of the cases before them.  In the Texas
survey, 96% of state and federal trial judges reported that they agreed
with the jury’s verdict in their cases “most or all of the time.”138  In a
1991 survey of Georgia state judges, 86% of the judges surveyed re-
ported they agreed with the jury in at least 79% of their negligence
cases.139  Nearly 10% of the surveyed judges reported even higher
levels of agreement.140
Studies of judge–jury agreement in both criminal and civil trials re-
veal substantial agreement levels.  In Kalven and Zeisel’s classic study
of the American jury, judges filled out questionnaires in over 3,500
criminal jury trials and approximately 4,000 civil trials, indicating how
the jury decided the case and how they would have decided it if it had
been a bench trial.141  In 78% of the criminal cases, the judge and jury
agreed on the verdict.142  In disagreement cases, the judge would have
convicted when the jury acquitted in 19% of the cases and the jury
131. Attanasio, supra note 127, at 1684.
132. Id. at 1685.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Mann v. Mann, 607 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tex. 1980).
136. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(c) (West 2014).
137. Pusey, supra note 124, at 10J.
138. Id.
139. Sentell, supra note 124, at 98 (“Of the 99 [judges answering the question], 86 judges
estimated their experience to be . . . that they agreed with the jury . . . in at least 79% of their
negligence cases.”).
140. Id. at 99 (“Of the [99 judges], 10 . . . emphasize[d] a ‘significantly higher percentage of
agreement.’”).
141. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 41, at 58–68.
142. Id. at 58–59.
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convicted when the judge would have acquitted in 3% of the cases, a
net leniency of 16%.143  These data were collected in the late 1950s,
but despite many changes in the make-up of the jury pool and the
bench, a nearly identical pattern—with 75% agreement—was found
more recently in a partial replication that surveyed judges for their
verdict preferences in criminal cases that produced 290 nonhung jury
verdicts in four locales.144  Unfortunately, only a few small studies
have used a similar methodology to assess judge–jury agreement in
civil cases.  The agreement rate from these studies ranges from 63% to
77%, based on samples of 40 to 83 cases.145
The earlier Kalven and Zeisel study found no difference in agree-
ment rate based on the judge’s rated complexity of the case.146  Simi-
larly, the Eisenberg et al. study found no significant difference in
agreement rate for cases rated as low, medium, or high on legal com-
plexity.147  These results reflect what Kalven and Zeisel called a “stun-
ning refutation of the claim that the jury does not understand.”148  The
judges in the Texas survey mirrored this assessment: nine of ten judges
said that jurors show considerable understanding of the legal issues
involved in the cases they hear.149  Finally, in the Georgia survey,
nearly 94% of the judges surveyed reported the jury had little trouble
understanding negligence cases.150  One judge in the Georgia survey
stated, “If a jury fails to grasp the issues, it is usually because the at-
torneys have failed in their presentations. . . . Juries are far more intel-
ligent than many attorneys want to admit.”151
Significant majorities of trial judges see juries as capable of deliver-
ing correct results, even in complex legal cases.152  That, of course,
143. Id.
144. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge–Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Repli-
cation of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 172–73,
180–82 (2005); see also Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of
Its Meaning and Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 48 (1994) (reporting approximately 73%
agreement across 77 criminal trials).
145. Diamond et al., supra note 27, at 19, 67 (reporting 77% agreement in 46 civil trials, and
74% agreement in 41 trials in which liability was contested); Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and
Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 342 tbl.1 (1998)
(reporting approximately 73% agreement in 83 trials in which the judge said the evidence either
favored the plaintiff or favored the defendant); Heuer & Penrod, supra note 144, at 48 tbl.13
(reporting approximately 63% agreement in 67 civil trials).
146. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 141, at 157.
147. Eisenberg et al., supra note 144, at 191.
148. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 141, at 157.
149. Pusey, supra note 124, at 10J.
150. Sentell, supra note 124, at 113–14 (“Of the 98 [judges responding], 92 agreed that the jury
generally experiences no difficulty in understanding the negligence case.”).
151. Id. at 114 (alteration in original).
152. Eisenberg et al., supra note 144, at 191.
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does not mean that judges uniformly agree with each jury verdict.
Some judges would prefer to reduce the use of the jury, but these
judges are in the minority.153  In the half century since publication of
The American Jury, the jury system continues to receive strong sup-
port from those who see it in action every day: the trial judges.
V. CONCLUSION
Although other trial judges share Judge Weinstein’s positive reac-
tion to the jury, his insights about the institution set him apart.  As this
Article shows, his perspective on the jury includes an appreciation of
its human limitations as well as its unique strengths.  Remarkably,
Judge Weinstein recognizes that judges too have limitations, and that
juries are often able to fill in the gaps in experience and understanding
of even the best judges.  Could Judge Weinstein have become so wise
about juries if he had spent all of his time on the bench as an appellate
court judge?  That is a thought experiment worth considering.  If the
trial court vantage point has contributed to the education of a decision
maker as perceptive and thoughtful as Judge Weinstein, it is worth
thinking about how valuable it would be to encourage all appellate
court judges and would-be appellate court judges to obtain experience
as trial court judges.
153. Pusey, supra note 124, at 10J.
